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The Digital Economy and Online Advertising Services: 
Policy Approaches and Case Law Analysis
by Tatiana Falcão
As we move into 2019, many of the issues that 
dominated international tax policy debates in 
2018 remain unsettled. One of the hottest issues is 
how to effectively and fairly tax the digital 
economy — a topic that only becomes more 
important with the passage of time.
At first glance, questions about digitalization 
may seem quite narrow. In reality, however, the 
debate encompasses some fundamental principles 
of cross-border taxation, including questions 
about the fair treatment of developing and 
developed countries and how those concerns 
inform the key concepts underlying the 
international tax system such as source and nexus. 
The unique characteristics of digitalized 
transactions mean that developed countries are 
suddenly facing concerns previously confined to 
the developing world, forcing these concerns — 
previously the domain of the U.N. — onto the 
agenda of the OECD, EU, and individual 
jurisdictions worldwide.
The debate regarding taxing digital goods and 
services includes several subtopics that inform the 
larger policy questions. One of the most notable of 
these topics is the taxation of digital advertising 
services. Looking at case studies about this issue 
helps clarify the complexities involved in the 
debate about taxing digitalized businesses and 
gives rise to some potential solutions, at least for 
the near term.
U.N. Tax Group Considers Digitalization
At the biannual meeting of the 17th session of 
the U.N. Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters (Committee of 
Experts, or the committee) in October 2018, the 
committee released an important paper — one it 
had originally restricted to its members’ eyes only 
— to the wider public.1 The paper is the work of 
the Subcommittee on Tax Challenges Related to 
the Digitalization of the Economy. Notably, 
because of the political sensitivity of its topic, the 
group is the only subcommittee within the 
Committee of Experts that is open exclusively to 
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1
U.N. Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax 
Matter, Subcommittee on Tax Challenges Related to the Digitalization of 
the Economy, E/C.18/2018/CRP.12 (Oct. 2, 2018). A list of subcommittee 
members is available on pages 3 and 4 of the report.
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committee members. Almost all committee 
members participate in this subcommittee, which 
operates behind closed doors.
October 2018 Subcommittee Paper
Most of the paper addresses recent 
international and country-level developments 
and regulatory approaches taken in response to 
the digitalization of the economy. What is striking 
is that the paper only covers developments 
involving the OECD, European Commission, and 
United States —  clearly demonstrating whose 
interests have dominated the debate thus far. The 
paper offers important insights that put the 
objectives of each of the three entities into 
perspective. It specifically notes that the European 
Council’s focus is “guaranteeing the level playing 
field in a single European Market, including by 
countering tax avoidance and evasion.” Likewise, 
the OECD’s Inclusive Framework is focused on 
“remov[ing] obstacles for international trade with 
measures to avoid double taxation and creating 
an effective tax system by avoiding tax avoidance 
through base erosion and artificial profit 
shifting.” Finally, the U.S. government’s 
responsibility is, especially in this moment, 
confined to the country’s own economy.
It is noteworthy that the paper does not, for 
instance, discuss India’s introduction of a 
significant economic presence test into its tax 
code.2 In the 2018 Finance Bill, the Indian 
government proposes that for domestic Indian tax 
purposes, “significant economic presence” shall 
mean:
(i) transaction in respect of any goods, 
services or property carried out by a non-
resident in India including provision of 
download of data or software in India if 
the aggregate of payments arising from 
such transaction or transactions during 
the previous year exceeds the amount as 
may be prescribed; or
(ii) systematic and continuous soliciting of 
its business activities or engaging in 
interaction with such number of users as 
may be prescribed, in India through 
digital means.
The activities will constitute substantial 
economic activity in India regardless of whether 
(i) the parties entered into the agreement for the 
stated transactions or activities in India; (ii) the 
nonresident has a residence or place of business in 
India; or (iii) the nonresident renders services in 
India. The explanatory memorandum released 
with the Finance Act clarifies that the government 
plans to introduce the new nexus rule into its 
double tax agreements and intends to apply the 
rule without overriding the tax treaties. Indian 
scholars are still struggling to understand the 
exact implications and scope of the significant 
economic presence rules, which are expected to 
enter into force April 1.
In spite of its limited focus, the stated intent of 
the U.N. subcommittee paper is to bring the 
digital economy debate closer in line with the 
interests of developing countries and the 
problems that they face. To do so, the 
subcommittee proposes using an initial 
questionnaire to investigate whether developing 
countries agree that the existing international tax 
rules, as framed, inhibit the allocation of taxing 
rights to the country where value is created. The 
questionnaire also inquires about the problems 
that developing countries face as to taxing digital 
activities and asks the countries what measures, if 
any, they have implemented to address those 
problems. The subcommittee intends to update 
the paper to include the experiences of 
developing countries and report on their 
concerns, the merits of coordination and 
coherence, the preferred characteristics of any 
long-term solution, and the risks and advantages 
of interim measures.
Interplay Between the U.N. and OECD
Notably, considering the context of and time 
frame for this investigation, which the committee 
expects to complete by its next meeting in April 
2019, the subcommittee (at least indirectly) is 
opting to wait for the OECD’s 2019 status update 
on the digitalization of the economy, have the 
policy debate under that framework, and have a 
developing country survey ready to release only 
when it is certain that the subcommittee’s output 
will not conflict with any of the decisions made at 
the OECD level.
One might hope that the subcommittee’s work 
would instruct the OECD’s 2020 final report, but 2Income Tax Act, section 9(1)(i) (with effect from April 1, 2019).
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there is no assurance that this will be the case 
seeing as the U.N. and the OECD workflows run 
parallel to each other.
Evolving Debates on Source and Nexus
It is true that when it comes to international 
tax policy development, there is sometimes a lack 
of awareness regarding the issues that developing 
countries face. However, the digitalization of the 
economy may be one of the few debates in which 
the interests of both developed and developing 
economies coincide because capturing rent from 
digital activities means allocating taxing rights to 
the source state.
Under the traditional international tax 
framework, the allocation of taxing rights to a 
source or resident state is almost always 
synonymous with conferring taxing rights on a 
developing or developed country, respectively. 
But the digital economy has changed that. 
Arguably, this is the first time that industrialized 
economies have faced difficulties taxing economic 
rent: a problem that was almost always restricted 
to developing economies in the days of brick-and-
mortar businesses. Being capable of capturing 
rent from digital activity in a country’s consumer 
market on a source basis is in the interest of every 
state, so all countries — developed and 
developing alike — have a sudden interest in 
behaving like source states. That is with the 
exception of those countries that harbor digital 
enterprises but do have significant consumer 
markets — countries that profit from inadequate 
regulation.
The digitalization of the economy has sparked 
a new debate about the establishment of nexus 
and economic substance in a source state. It is in 
establishing these new criteria for allocating the 
taxation rights over the business profits of digital 
enterprises that input from developing countries 
would be most helpful. Developing countries 
should be proactive in informing these policy 
debates and helping establish new international 
tax rules that are fair and equitable to all states.
Recent Case Studies on Digital Advertising
Because the U.N. questionnaire aims to get 
input from real-world practices, this article will 
now examine three recent cases involving the 
digitalization of the economy: two court decisions 
and one tax settlement. The two court 
proceedings began after an assessment by France, 
undisputedly a developed country. However, the 
issues France faces and the structures it questions 
are consistent with those one usually sees when 
considering the erosion of the tax base in 
developing countries. The issues are the same 
regardless of the countries where they take place. 
The third case study involves the United 
Kingdom’s tax settlement with Google involving 
tax liabilities from 2005 to 2015.
It is worth pointing out that the push toward 
new rules for taxing the digital economy has, in 
many respects, been driven by the French 
government, at both the EU and OECD levels. For 
example, it is striking to note the similarity 
between many of the findings in the Collin and 
Colin report,3 which was prepared at the request 
of the French Parliament in 2013, and the findings 
in the 2016 OECD Interim Report on the 
Digitalization of the Economy. The Collin and 
Colin report was arguably the first report to 
actually raise the problem of how to efficiently tax 
value creation in a multi-sided market through 
the use of data tracking techniques and to discuss 
whether collecting data in a country could de 
facto create a permanent establishment of the firm 
in that country.
The French case law reported below follows 
similar lines, highlighting some of the issues that 
tax authorities are facing as they try to collect the 
rent associated with the digitalization of the 
economy. All of the case studies focus on the 
online advertising business. Notably, the tax 
administration’s pleas were unsuccessful in both 
cases — largely because of the existing 
international tax legislation’s inability to handle 
the unique characteristics of the digital 
businesses.
3
Pierre Collin and Nicolas Colin, “Task Force on Taxation of the 
Digital Economy,” Report to the French Minister for the Economy and 
Finance, the Minister for Industrial Recovery, the Minister Delegate for 
the Budget, and the Minister Delegate for Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises, Innovation, and the Digital Economy (Jan. 2013).
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The Google Case
Google Ireland Ltd. (1505178/1-1)4 concerns the 
taxation of the profits Google derived from its 
AdWords program (also known as Google Ads) in 
France. The court case before the Administrative 
Tribunal in Paris (Tribunal Administratif de Paris) 
involved a corrective assessment of Google 
Ireland Ltd.’s activities in France based on a series 
of requests for information that the French tax 
authorities sent to their counterparts in Ireland, 
the Netherlands, and the United States. In the 
corrective assessment, the French authorities held 
that Google Ireland obtained a significant amount 
of profit from French customers’ use of the 
AdWords program in addition to the profits 
Google France, a fully owned subsidiary of 
Google Ireland, reported. Based on the 
information they obtained from the other 
countries, the French tax authorities concluded 
that Google Ireland was selling online 
advertisement space using an agency PE 
arrangement in France. Under the terms of article 
2(9)(c) in the France-Ireland tax treaty, they 
contended that profits from the sale of 
advertisement space in France by means of the 
agency PE were subject to French tax.
Note that what this article calls “the Google 
case” is actually a series of five lower court rulings 
involving Google. The first set of cases (1505178/1-
1 and 1505113/1-1) involves the application of 
French corporate income tax to Google’s business 
activities in France. The second set of cases 
(1505147/1-1 and 1505126/1-1) concerns the 
presence of immovable property or assets in 
France that were at the disposal of the (alleged) 
French PE and could give rise to the taxe 
professionnelle des entreprises (in digital parlance, 
this might be equivalent to an infrastructure use 
tax). The last case (1505113/1-1) in the set concerns 
the application of French VAT to Google’s 
services.
To understand this dispute, it helps to have 
some general knowledge about the AdWords 
business model in addition to the facts included in 
the ruling. Broadly, advertisers pay Google to 
display advertising content to targeted web users 
and, in return, Google allows this content to pop 
up on the targeted users’ screens. Targeting 
occurs through the sale of pre-defined keywords. 
Advertisers pay to have their content — banners, 
homepage address, product listings, and so forth 
— associated with the keyword searches that 
Google users enter into the search engine. Google 
typically gets paid every time a user clicks on the 
online advertisement material. Google sets the 
price for keywords using an auction-based 
marketplace: The minimum price for a keyword is 
5 cents, but in highly competitive categories 
Google could make up to 1,000 times more per 
click. The price depends on the level of market 
interest for that particular keyword. Some of the 
most expensive keywords are “lawyer,” 
“insurance,” and “loans,” for example. The 
advertiser that pays the highest price for a 
keyword receives the highest level of association 
with that keyword across all of Google’s online 
platforms including the search engine, 
advertisements, private website banner spaces, 
and online shopping spaces that use Google feeds.
According to the court, Google provides 
AdWords services under two modalities. The 
simplest option is the online sales organization 
modality, geared toward clients who prefer to 
independently manage their online advertising 
activities. This is a cheaper service that does not 
offer any tailor-made solutions to the clients. 
Advertisers gain access to an online AdWords 
portal and set up their own advertisement 
campaigns. These advertisements probably will 
not hold the top spots since these clients do not 
maximize the algorithm’s capabilities. The second 
option is the direct sales organization modality, 
which provides customers with more commercial 
assistance and account management services, 
thus maximizing the potential of the algorithm.
In the case at hand, employees of Google 
France, on behalf of Google Ireland, provided this 
second type of services to Google Ireland’s top 
clients in France. The French tax authorities 
contested this second modality of the AdWords 
product.
As structured, the activities that Google 
France performed were for the benefit of Google 
Ireland, and they were exclusively rendered 
4
France: Tribunal Administratif Paris, No. 1505178/1-1 (June 12, 
2017); summary by Bob Michel, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. The author 
thanks Bob Michel for summarizing the details of the case. See also 
Alexander Lewis, “Google Does Not Have PE in France, Court Holds,” 
Tax Notes Int’l, July 13, 2017, p. 207.
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under a marketing and services agreement that 
Google France and Google Ireland, its parent 
company, entered into in 2002. The agreement 
remunerated the subsidiary on a cost-plus basis 
with a profit markup of 8 percent.
From documents seized during the tax audit, 
it appeared that Google France assigned some of 
its employees recruiting missions to prospect for 
new clients with a goal of increasing the 
operation’s turnover. Internal communication 
records between employees showed that some 
employees were involved in managing client 
portfolios and charged with the task of 
negotiating contracts with clients. Some of the 
documents that the tax authorities uncovered 
referred to Google France as “the seller” or 
“responsible for sales.” Lastly, it appeared that 
Google France had hired an in-house lawyer to 
advise on the negotiation and drafting of 
contracts with French clients.
The court’s analysis included the following 
questions:
• Did Google Ireland have either a PE in 
France under article 4 of the France-Ireland 
tax treaty or an agency PE under article 
2(9)(c), and, therefore, was it liable for 
corporate income tax and withholding tax 
on royalties?
• If the PE existed, was French VAT due on 
advertisement services provided via the PE?
The tax authorities lost on all accounts, and 
ultimately, the court held that there was no tax 
due to be paid in France. In its decision, the court 
did not rely on the facts of the case, but instead 
focused on the contractual agreement between 
Google Ireland and Google France. The tax 
authorities have filed an appeal with the 
Administrative Court of Appeal (Cour 
Administrative d’Appel) contesting the lower 
court’s ruling. A decision is expected in 2019.
Below is a short summary of the findings.
Corporate Income Tax
The Administrative Tribunal in Paris observed 
that the obligations that the marketing and 
services agreement conferred on Google France 
prevented the conclusion that it was independent 
from Google Ireland, even if the facts of the case 
indicated that Google Ireland did not directly 
control Google France in practice. Specifically, the 
agreement provided that:
during the provision of the assistance to 
the sale of the services, Google France 
agrees that it does not have the power to 
bind Google Ireland, nor to act as its 
mandatory or authorized representative 
mandated to acting for the account or in 
the name of Google Ireland or to sign 
contracts in the name of the latter. More 
specifically, Google France will not 
negotiate service or license contracts for 
the account of Google Ireland nor will it 
accept such orders.
Therefore, the court rejected the argument 
that Google France was an “agent of an 
independent status” under the terms of article 
2(9)(c) of the treaty.
Based on the same contractual arguments, the 
administrative court found that Google France 
did not have the authority to conclude contracts in 
the name of Google Ireland, even if it might be 
considered a dependent agent of the latter.
VAT
Using the same reasoning, the court 
concluded that Google Ireland did not have 
sufficient technical equipment in France for it to 
autonomously provide advertising services in 
France. As a result, it did not have a fixed base in 
France for VAT purposes.
The Valueclick Case
During the taxable years at issue in this 
dispute (2009 to 2011), Valueclick (now 
Conversant) was one of the leading companies 
operating an advertisement display network — 
that is, a collection of privately owned websites 
that the ad network company pays to display 
specified advertisements when users visit the 
websites. While Google’s AdWords program is 
both a display network and a search network (that 
is, advertisements are based on search engine 
results), self-standing display networks often 
specialize in niche areas. For instance, a display 
ad network that specializes in high-end travel 
would bring together multiple quality travel 
websites and use advertisements from high-end 
travel providers to monetize user visits. By using 
specific websites, they target the advertised 
content at a specific audience interested in those 
products.
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The similarities between the Google and 
Valueclick (17PA01538)5 cases are astounding, 
especially the corporate structures used to 
provide online advertising services. Valueclick 
International Ltd. (Valueclick Ireland) was a 
subsidiary of Valueclick Inc., a U.S. company 
(Valueclick U.S.). Valueclick Ireland set up local 
subsidiaries in various EU member states to 
provide marketing services. Valueclick Ireland 
signed all of the contracts that the subsidiaries 
concluded. This dispute focused on Valueclick 
France and the marketing services it performed in 
accordance with the intercompany services 
agreement between the French and Irish affiliates. 
The contractual definition of marketing services 
included the:
prospection of potential clients, 
management services, back-office 
services, administrative and accounting 
services, human resources management, 
treasury management and the 
management of information technology.
The agreement expressly provided that the 
contracting parties were independent and that the 
contract did not create an agency relationship or 
constitute a relationship between partners in a 
joint business. The agreement expressly excluded 
representation rights that would allow one party 
to bind the other party to agreements with third 
parties, and denied each party authorization to 
sign contracts in the other party’s name. Finally, 
like in the Google case, Valueclick Ireland 
remunerated Valueclick France for its services on 
a fixed 8 percent cost-plus basis.
Both the issues that the tax administration 
raised during the tax assessment and the outcome 
of the Valueclick case are nearly identical to the 
Google case. The proceedings focused on several 
related issues:
• the presence of a PE of Valueclick Ireland in 
France in the form of the subsidiary’s fixed 
place of business under article 2(9) of the 
France-Ireland tax treaty;
• the presence of a dependency relationship 
between Valueclick Ireland and Valueclick 
France, including whether the French 
subsidiary was a dependent agent of the 
Irish entity; and
• the existence of a fixed establishment in 
France, such as would allow France to 
charge VAT on the online advertisement 
services provided in France.
Much like the administrative tribunal in 
Google, the court of appeal in Valueclick applied 
and interpreted the agreement between the 
French and Irish entities, focusing on the 
language and scope of the agreement and 
overlooking the tax administration’s arguments 
stemming from the fact-finding investigation and 
documents it seized during the assessment phase. 
Thus, given the broad scope of the intercompany 
services agreement, which covered all aspects of 
marketing including prospecting for clients, the 
court found that Valueclick France did not 
provide services beyond its mandate in a manner 
that could create a PE of Valueclick Ireland in 
France.
Since the agreement expressly excluded the 
ability of the French and Irish entities to engage in 
an agency relationship, the court held that the 
findings did not support a dependent agent 
status. The fact that Valueclick France employees 
could negotiate the terms of the contracts with 
French clients — and that the French staff even 
presented themselves as employees of Valueclick 
Ireland — was not enough to create an agency 
relationship.
As for potential VAT liability, the court 
concluded that Valueclick France did not have 
sufficient infrastructure to operate autonomously. 
According to the court, the main IT infrastructure 
that Valueclick France used was located outside 
France (namely, in the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
the United States) and the information and 
connection technology available in France was the 
minimum needed to allow the company to access 
the main infrastructure abroad. Therefore, no VAT 
was due.
The tax authorities have appealed the decision 
of the court of appeal in Valueclick to the Council 
of State (Conseil d’État). A decision is expected in 
2019. Observers expect that the ruling will clarify 
the rules regarding PEs in the online 
advertisement business and may also apply to the 
Google case, which is pending before the appellate 
court.
5
The author thanks Bob Michel for summarizing the details of the 
case in IBFD’s tax treaty case law database.
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Google’s Tax Settlement in the U.K.
The next case study concerns a U.K. tax 
settlement, the details of which are confidential, 
through which Google settled tax liabilities for the 
tax years 2005 to 2015. The settlement, in the 
amount of £130 million (of which £18 million were 
interest) was later considered by the House of 
Commons, during a parliamentary review, to be 
“disproportionately small when compared with 
the size of Google’s business in the UK.”6 
According to the parliamentary report, “the UK is 
Google’s second largest market (after the U.S.), 
contributing to US$7 billion in revenue in 2015 
alone, or around 10 [percent] of Google’s 
worldwide income.”
Tax settlements in the United Kingdom are 
not transparent; therefore, the only information 
available to the public is that contained in the 
House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts report. HM Revenue & Customs 
formally opened an investigation into Google’s 
tax affairs in 2010 following a tax assessment of 
the company. The main issues under dispute in 
the investigation were the transfer pricing method 
and the value of Google’s economic activities in 
the United Kingdom. At stake were how much 
value Google’s activities in the United Kingdom 
created (namely, advertising services like those at 
issue in the French court cases as well as research 
and development activities), how those activities 
would have been remunerated on an arm’s-length 
basis, and which transfer pricing methods should 
apply. Another pending question was whether a 
foreign Google company — once again, Google 
Ireland — should be considered to have a PE in 
the United Kingdom. Unsurprisingly, all these 
issues are similar to those in the later French cases.
Notably, a committee report from June 2013 
had previously concluded that to avoid U.K. 
corporation tax, Google relies on:
the deeply unconvincing argument that its 
sales to UK clients take place in Ireland, 
despite clear evidence that the vast 
majority of sales activity takes place in the 
UK.7
The 2013 report includes a summary of 
evidence that Google provided when the 
committee invited a company representative to 
comment on the business activities taking place in 
the United Kingdom. The representative 
emphasized that Google’s local subsidiary did not 
engage in sales in the United Kingdom — a key 
point for determining PE status — and said that 
Google Ireland directly executed all advertising 
sales contracts. Former Google employees, 
identified as whistleblowers in the report, 
contested this information and asserted that the 
U.K. staff carried out the substance of the work 
that led to contracts with major U.K. clients. 
Similar to what was later described in the French 
cases, the Google U.K. representative eventually 
conceded that the top 1 percent of Google’s clients 
in the United Kingdom — the clients with “higher 
value prestige accounts” — did have close, direct 
relationships with the U.K. staff and met with 
them regularly. The U.K. staff would discuss 
account details and statistics with these prestige 
clients and, as the Google representative admitted 
to the committee:
UK clients would feel they were being sold 
to by UK staff. . . . However, while [the 
representative] accepted that UK staff 
could agree a sale, he stated that they did 
not have the ability to commit Google UK 
Ltd to any contracts, or to conclude a 
transaction, and that no money changed 
hands within the UK.
Based on oral statements from Google 
representatives, the 2013 report also concluded 
that although Google’s engineers in the United 
Kingdom were not developing new products, 
they were contributing to the development of 
products, and that the engineering work 
performed in the United Kingdom was creating 
economic value.
Although the 2013 report instructed the 2016 
HMRC investigation, there is no evidence to 
suggest that it influenced the settlement between 
6
U.K. House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, “Corporate 
Tax Settlements,” HC 788 (Feb. 23, 2016).
7
U.K. House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, “Tax 
Avoidance — Google, Ninth Report of Session 2013-14,” HC 112 (June 
2013).
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HMRC and Google. Nonetheless, it provides 
valuable insights into Google’s operations in 
Europe — insights later confirmed by the cases in 
France.
The 2016 report also discloses that HMRC and 
HM Treasury were working with five other 
countries — the so-called E6 — to share 
information about digital multinationals and gain 
a better understanding of how these enterprises 
act in different jurisdictions. This initiative is part 
of the OECD’s base erosion and profit-shifting 
project.
The 2016 Committee of Public Accounts 
report also sheds light on an investigation 
regarding Google’s activities in Italy, where 
investigators are reportedly seeking the 
equivalent of £150 million in back taxes, further 
illustrating how these issues are reverberating 
throughout the EU member states.
Analysis
These three case studies provide valuable 
insight into the business model for digital 
advertising in the EU. When advertising in the 
common market, Google and other advertising 
companies base their operations in Ireland and 
then engage the whole common market through 
independent subsidiaries. By entering into a 
broad-based agreement and remunerating the 
local subsidiary on a cost-plus basis, these 
companies succeed in allocating most of their 
profits to Ireland, where they face a significantly 
lower tax rate. The tax basis in the source 
countries — that is, the other EU member states — 
is eroded because they lose the potential tax 
revenue derived from the activities that take place 
in their jurisdictions — the places where value is 
actually created. Whether this model is being 
deployed in other parts of the world is an issue 
that would require further research, though it 
may not be that difficult to uncover.
Comparing the French and U.K. Google cases, 
one notices significant similarities in the facts. Yet 
the tax administrations’ investigations into the 
offshore provision of online advertisement 
services to local clients with assistance of local 
employees — and their approaches to taxing 
those services — are markedly different. The 
French tax authorities focused heavily on a PE 
approach, trying to qualify the activities of Google 
Ireland in France as a PE that would create 
attributable profits taxable in France. This 
approach yielded little result. In the United 
Kingdom, at least from the limited information 
that can be found in the parliamentary 
documents, it seems like the U.K. tax authorities 
preferred the certainty of settling for a transfer 
pricing adjustment (which, to an industry 
observer, seems to be rather low) to account for 
the remuneration paid by Google Ireland to 
Google U.K. for services rendered.
In both cases, it is clear that even though the 
online advertisement business is a core part of the 
digital economy, this business model includes a 
few important aspects of the brick-and-mortar 
economy: Namely, the companies have some form 
of physical presence in the market countries and 
value can be derived from that physical presence. 
The real issue is that the transfer pricing allocation 
models cannot account for the value that the 
source state generates. A profit split might be a 
more appropriate tool to reflect value generation 
in each state.8
The French courts have opted to respect 
contractual terms and language over factual 
assessments, an approach that has benefited from 
a very broad contractual arrangement that would 
arguably include more than just marketing and 
support services in the local jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the argument that some of the activities 
performed in the local jurisdiction would 
constitute a PE was rooted in the idea that the 
activities that actually occurred in the source state 
went beyond what those the parties listed in and 
remunerated under the contract. Had the French 
appellate court accepted this argument, France 
could only tax income from the services Google 
Ireland provided that went beyond the scope of 
the services agreement.
Moving Forward
From the foregoing case studies and the 
review of general principles of digital taxation, 
there appear to be two potential policy 
approaches to consider as this debate continues.
8
See BEPS Monitoring Group, “Comments on the Public Discussion 
Draft on Revised Guidance on Profit Splits” (Jan. 2018) (filed in response 
to the EU’s consultation on fair taxation of the digital economy).
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The first and simplest option might be to 
apply a withholding tax such as tax on fees for 
technical services that follows the basic contours 
of the U.N. model’s article 12A. Broadly, article 
12A allows a contracting state to tax, at a rate 
negotiated by the contracting states, fees for 
specific technical services that a resident of one 
state pays to a resident of the other contracting 
state on a gross basis.9 The contracting states 
could extend article 12A to apply to all services — 
not just fees for technical services — providing a 
treaty-based approach that is similar to the 
proposals being advanced by the EU and other 
select jurisdictions as interim measures to address 
the digitalization of the economy. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, HM Treasury put forward 
a treasury consultation on November 7, 2018, that 
discusses the suitability of imposing an interim 
tax on digital services pending international 
agreement on a long-term solution. Likewise, the 
Spanish government put out a consultation on a 3 
percent DST on companies with annual turnover 
greater than €750 million and Spanish sales 
exceeding €3 million.
The second short-term policy option might be 
to impose a reporting requirement on digital 
companies with substantial and long-lasting 
engagement in a particular market (that is, either 
a user or consumer base). This requirement would 
apply to any activities that include:
• a user base;
• paying clients intending to explore the user 
base;
• technical equipment or infrastructure, even 
if it only has an auxiliary function; and
• employees engaging with or exploring the 
consumer base for the benefit of third-party 
entities.
Based on the case studies above, this might be 
a suitable approach to capture the rent derived 
from the provision of online advertising services. 
This approach would also allow tax authorities to 
study the market and determine the best way to 
allocate the disclosed income to the source and 
residence jurisdictions using either existing or 
new allocation rules. 
9
Tatiana Falcão, “The U.N. Model’s New Fees for Technical Services 
Provision,” Tax Notes Int’l, July 23, 2018, p. 367.
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